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	<title>The Public Purse &#187; municipal bond default</title>
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		<title>San Diego City’s Financial Crisis: The Past, Present and Future</title>
		<link>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/06/09/san-diego-city%e2%80%99s-financial-crisis-the-past-present-and-future/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/06/09/san-diego-city%e2%80%99s-financial-crisis-the-past-present-and-future/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 09 Jun 2010 14:29:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Natalie Cohen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Budget and Finance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taxpayer v. union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bankruptcy and default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bonds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[California]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chapter 9]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fiscal emergency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bankruptcy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bond default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[state and local politics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.thepublicpurse.com/?p=979</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Grand Jury of San Diego issued a report of this title yesterday.  Also, at yesterday’s GFOA (Government Finance Officers Association) business meeting, the group voted  that the Government Accounting Standards Board should stay away from the topic of sustainability.  The only conclusion one can draw from the Grand Jury report is: the city of [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/06/09/san-diego-city%e2%80%99s-financial-crisis-the-past-present-and-future/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Xenia Defaults, the USDA, Bond Insurance and Novation</title>
		<link>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/05/02/xenia-defaults-the-usda-bond-insurance-and-novation/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/05/02/xenia-defaults-the-usda-bond-insurance-and-novation/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 May 2010 22:18:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Natalie Cohen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[bankruptcy and default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bond insurance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bonds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fiscal emergency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bond default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[non-rated bonds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[special district]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.thepublicpurse.com/?p=894</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Add Xenia Rural Water District’s to the short but growing list of over-leveraged municipal borrowers.  With $143 million in debt and about 9,000 customers, the unfolding socio-gram includes bondholders, bond insurers CIFG and Assured Guaranty, the US Department of Agriculture, Bank of America, and last, but not least, the ratepayers.  A $5.2 million note to [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/05/02/xenia-defaults-the-usda-bond-insurance-and-novation/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>3</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Municipal Market Meltdown?  Response to Bookstaber</title>
		<link>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/04/09/municipal-market-meltdown-response-to-bookstaber/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/04/09/municipal-market-meltdown-response-to-bookstaber/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Apr 2010 14:33:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Natalie Cohen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Budget and Finance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Voter initiatives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bankruptcy and default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bond insurance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[housing mess]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bonds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pensions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[securities lending]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[states]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ballot initiatives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[community development district]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[direct democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[liquidity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bankruptcy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bond default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ratings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[state and local politics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.thepublicpurse.com/?p=839</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[We have two opposing camps in the muni-market at the moment: those who say it is the next systemic shoe to drop and the rating agencies that are systemically raising ratings.
Which is right?
We have moved from a market that has had heavy intermediation from the bond insurance companies to one where investors are on their [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/04/09/municipal-market-meltdown-response-to-bookstaber/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>5</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>troubles in toledo</title>
		<link>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/02/19/troubles-in-toledo/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/02/19/troubles-in-toledo/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 04:27:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Natalie Cohen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[bankruptcy and default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bonds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chapter 9]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fiscal stress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bankruptcy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bond default]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.thepublicpurse.com/?p=712</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Looks like the city is making its best effort to try to resolve budget imbalance.  Ohio is one of the states that has a strong oversight/receivership program and municipalities may not file bankruptcy without approval of the state.  Local governments there do rely on income taxes, which is tough in the current economy, especially in [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/02/19/troubles-in-toledo/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Rethinking Municipal Guarantees, &#8220;look-throughs&#8221; and Ratings</title>
		<link>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/02/16/rethinking-municipal-guarantees-look-throughs-and-ratings/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/02/16/rethinking-municipal-guarantees-look-throughs-and-ratings/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Feb 2010 17:16:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Natalie Cohen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[bankruptcy and default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bonds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chapter 9]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fiscal stress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bankruptcy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bond default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[state and local politics]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.thepublicpurse.com/?p=697</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Harrisburg, Pennsylvania can&#8217;t really afford to pay for the Resource Recovery bonds that it guaranteed.  Their recently adopted 2010 budget does not include debt service for this guarantee (see prior post with link).  It is accepted practice for rating agencies to rate municipally (or state) guaranteed debt off the credit of the guarantor.  Unlike bond [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2010/02/16/rethinking-municipal-guarantees-look-throughs-and-ratings/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>California Mello-Roos Bond Defaults Likely to Increase</title>
		<link>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2009/12/18/california-mello-roos-bond-defaults-likely-to-increase/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2009/12/18/california-mello-roos-bond-defaults-likely-to-increase/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Dec 2009 18:28:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Natalie Cohen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[bankruptcy and default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[California]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bond default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[special district]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.thepublicpurse.com/?p=439</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In a recent report about Mello-Roos Community Facility Districts (CFD’s) the California Debt and Investment Advisory Commission (CDIAC) stated:
Despite the potential impacts of evolving mortgage conditions, CFD’s have not reported higher default rates, at least through 2007-2008, but have reported a recent rise in the number of their draws on reserves.
(Mello-Roos bonds are post-proposition 13 [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2009/12/18/california-mello-roos-bond-defaults-likely-to-increase/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>Prichard, Alabama fails to pay retirees</title>
		<link>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2009/10/14/prichard-alabama-fails-to-pay-retirees/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2009/10/14/prichard-alabama-fails-to-pay-retirees/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2009 12:53:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Natalie Cohen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[bankruptcy and default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bond insurance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chapter 9]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bond default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prichard Alabama]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.thepublicpurse.com/?p=270</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The check is not in the mail.  Prichard, Alabama, came out of Chapter 9 bankruptcy in 2002 and promised to make deposits into its public pension fund.  They didn’t and now they are simply out of money.  Retirees did not get their October 1 payment.    What’s next?  The retirees are suing.  The city is looking [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2009/10/14/prichard-alabama-fails-to-pay-retirees/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Municipal Bond Default Story, Part II</title>
		<link>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2009/10/12/the-municipal-bond-default-story-part-ii/</link>
		<comments>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2009/10/12/the-municipal-bond-default-story-part-ii/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2009 22:26:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Natalie Cohen</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[bankruptcy and default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bonds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[community development district]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Florida]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[municipal bond default]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[special district]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.thepublicpurse.com/?p=177</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Municipal bond defaults over the last two years occur in sectors that tie into the financial crisis: real estate.  Multi-family housing and land development projects that never took off are at the front line.  Special entities – usually a district of some kind, depending on the state – sell tax-exempt bonds to finance infrastructure for [...]]]></description>
		<wfw:commentRss>http://www.thepublicpurse.com/2009/10/12/the-municipal-bond-default-story-part-ii/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
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